Facts: Man was arrested and charged with first degree murder for killing Wife after she threatened to divorce him for infidelity. Investigators determined that she had been killed by a blow to the back of the head with a fireplace implement. The home had been ransacked and jewelry was missing, but the authorities later recovered the jewelry in the trunk of Man's car wrapped in duct tape. A criminologist testified that the theft and ransacking appeared to have been staged. Man's DNA was found on the murder weapon. It was also found on duct tape that was near the victim's body and on the duct tape that was used to wrap the missing jewelry. There were burns on the body and a spent matchstick was found in Man's bedroom. Man had told a former employee that the only way his marriage with Wife would end would be by the death of either one of them. Man argued that he couldn't have killed Wife with a blow to the head because of recent rotator cuff surgery. [Note: The rotator cuff is the connective tissue in the shoulder.] However, the week after the murder, police observed Man use a two-by-four to pry something out of a concrete slab at a construction site. Man suggested that one of Man's former employees had committed the murder to obtain money to pay off a debt owed to Man.
Procedural history: At the close of evidence, the prosecution requested an "aiding and abetting" instruction for the jury. State argued that Man was capable of wielding the fireplace implement, but even if he wasn't, he could still be convicted under an aiding-and-abetting theory. The jury convicted Man of first degree murder without specifying which theory they applied. Man appealed, arguing that he had not had adequate notice of the possibility of conviction under an aiding-and-abetting theory. The appeals court upheld the conviction, holding that (1) pleadings charging a defendant with murder need not specify the theory of murder; (2) even if such specificity were required, it was provided here. State supreme court denied Man's petition for review. Thereafter, Man filed a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. The district court granted relief. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that while the initial pleadings were sufficient to put Man on notice that he could be convicted either as a principal or as an aider-and-abettor, because under State's law aiding-and-abetting were equivalent to the principal crime, Man's Sixth Amendment and due process right to notice were violated because the prosecution had tried Man as a principal, and only introduced the aiding-and-abetting theory at the end of the trial, when it requested the aiding-and-abetting instruction. For this theory--that Sixth Amendment and due process rights are violated when the prosecution only focuses on one theory at trial--the Ninth Circuit cited its own precedent. The Ninth Circuit also rejected the state appeals court's holding that the preliminary examination testimony and jury instruction conference were adequate notice as "an unreasonable determination of the facts"
Outcome: Reversed and remanded.
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that Man had notice; therefore, the only question is whether the prosecution's focus on one theory at trial and then requesting the aiding-and-abetting jury instruction at the end are sufficient to warrant habeas relief. The Ninth Circuit cited no Supreme Court precedent for this--only Supreme Court cases holding the general proposition that notice is required of the charges against a defendant. None of the Supreme Court decisions that the Ninth Circuit cites even "remotely" address the specific fact situation in this case. The Ninth Circuit, not having any Supreme Court precedent to rely on, was therefore required--to reach the conclusion it came to--to cite its own precedent, Sheppard v. Rees, 909 F.2d 1234 (Ninth Circuit 1989), which it then declared to be an accurate representation of prior Supreme Court precedent.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act requires that habeas petitions be granted only if the state court decision was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court". The Ninth Circuit attempted to get around AEDPA by saying that Sheppard was an expression of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. However, under Marshall v. Rodgers, 569 U.S. ___ (2013), a federal appeals court (that is to say, a circuit court), cannot "refine or sharpen a general principle of Supreme Court jurisprudence into a specific legal rule that [the Supreme Court] has not announced" (italics mine). The Ninth Circuit concluded that the state appeals court's holding that the preliminary hearing and jury instruction conference were sufficient to give notice was a factual disagreement; it is, on the contrary, a legal disagreement.
Procedural history: At the close of evidence, the prosecution requested an "aiding and abetting" instruction for the jury. State argued that Man was capable of wielding the fireplace implement, but even if he wasn't, he could still be convicted under an aiding-and-abetting theory. The jury convicted Man of first degree murder without specifying which theory they applied. Man appealed, arguing that he had not had adequate notice of the possibility of conviction under an aiding-and-abetting theory. The appeals court upheld the conviction, holding that (1) pleadings charging a defendant with murder need not specify the theory of murder; (2) even if such specificity were required, it was provided here. State supreme court denied Man's petition for review. Thereafter, Man filed a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. The district court granted relief. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that while the initial pleadings were sufficient to put Man on notice that he could be convicted either as a principal or as an aider-and-abettor, because under State's law aiding-and-abetting were equivalent to the principal crime, Man's Sixth Amendment and due process right to notice were violated because the prosecution had tried Man as a principal, and only introduced the aiding-and-abetting theory at the end of the trial, when it requested the aiding-and-abetting instruction. For this theory--that Sixth Amendment and due process rights are violated when the prosecution only focuses on one theory at trial--the Ninth Circuit cited its own precedent. The Ninth Circuit also rejected the state appeals court's holding that the preliminary examination testimony and jury instruction conference were adequate notice as "an unreasonable determination of the facts"
Outcome: Reversed and remanded.
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that Man had notice; therefore, the only question is whether the prosecution's focus on one theory at trial and then requesting the aiding-and-abetting jury instruction at the end are sufficient to warrant habeas relief. The Ninth Circuit cited no Supreme Court precedent for this--only Supreme Court cases holding the general proposition that notice is required of the charges against a defendant. None of the Supreme Court decisions that the Ninth Circuit cites even "remotely" address the specific fact situation in this case. The Ninth Circuit, not having any Supreme Court precedent to rely on, was therefore required--to reach the conclusion it came to--to cite its own precedent, Sheppard v. Rees, 909 F.2d 1234 (Ninth Circuit 1989), which it then declared to be an accurate representation of prior Supreme Court precedent.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act requires that habeas petitions be granted only if the state court decision was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court". The Ninth Circuit attempted to get around AEDPA by saying that Sheppard was an expression of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. However, under Marshall v. Rodgers, 569 U.S. ___ (2013), a federal appeals court (that is to say, a circuit court), cannot "refine or sharpen a general principle of Supreme Court jurisprudence into a specific legal rule that [the Supreme Court] has not announced" (italics mine). The Ninth Circuit concluded that the state appeals court's holding that the preliminary hearing and jury instruction conference were sufficient to give notice was a factual disagreement; it is, on the contrary, a legal disagreement.
